federal reserve

Want to know what is the biggest threat to your prosperity? Look no further than the policy statement released last night by the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)- America’s monetary politburo, the nation’s committee for financial central planning staffed with a select group of highly educated bureaucrats and guided by a former economics professor, and continuously engaged in administratively setting interest rates, manipulating asset prices and determining the extent of lending in what is really the pseudo-capitalist economy of the U.S. of A.

I don’t mean the specific wording of the statement that gets the economists on Wall Street so excited – what phrase did they change? Is this more hawkish or more dovish than last month’s statement? –Who cares? What matters is the sheer and utter economic idiocy underlying the Federal Reserve’s ‘mandate’ and being at the core of practically every fiat money central bank. What you see in this statement – black on white – is the conceptual lunacy at the heart of our global paper money system, the reason we are in a massive crisis and about to get deeper into it.

The core belief enshrined in this document, and indeed in every Fed policy statement, is this: the central bank can and should, via discretionary changes in the supply of state paper money, affect interest rates in such a way that the economy reaches full employment and enjoys stable prices. What frivolous hubris! In a proper market economy, interest rates would, of course, be set by the market and result from the free interplay of voluntary saving and voluntary investment decisions by independent agents. Alas, not so in our semi-socialist system of state-controlled fiat money with a central planning bank. The committee knows better what interest rates and asset prices the economy needs to reach its full potential. After all, the committee is staffed with really clever people. Such things cannot be left to the public or – the market.

Think about the puerile assumption behind this: Good, lasting and competitive jobs, one assumes, not as a result of saving, capital formation and entrepreneurial risk taking but as a result of clever monetary manipulation by the FOMC. And as the committee has ascertained that, presently, the US public is not reaching its full economic potential, Americans need to be cajoled into doing better with continuing super low interest rates that encourage them to go more into debt, and with delicately manipulated bond prices via the Fed’s debt monetisation program. This is such unspeakable rubbish, and such a shameless declaration of administrative arrogance, I can’t believe that many people outside the common-sense-free ivory tower of the MIT economics department and the privileged paper money aristocracy takes this seriously. My sense is fewer and fewer people in the real world do.

 

Ben Bernanke

Not Paul Volcker! (Photo by U.S. Federal Reserve)

This idiotic assumption is the reason the entire world has, over the past forty years, converted from commodity money, or, paper money at least tentatively linked to commodities, to complete fiat money systems in which the supply of money is not only fully elastic and unrestricted by any ‘barbaric’ raw materials -shudder! -but under the full control of the enlightened and well-meaning state bureaucracy. By injecting new money into the economy, full employment can be generated. Fantastic! No really, it is fantastic. I mean fantastic as in imaginary, fanciful, implausible, incredible, insane, ludicrous, mad, irrational, nonsensical, outlandish and preposterous. That type of fantastic.

Make no mistake. This system is not only suboptimal, it is unsustainable. And we have already reached the endgame.

Of course, by printing new money, expanding the central bank balance sheet and artificially lowering interest rates, – something that has been done on a vast scale for decades on end! – extra economic activity can be generated for a period. Lower interest rates fool the public into believing that more savings are available, that the consumer is okay with more resources being diverted from meeting present consumption needs and towards meeting needs in the more remote future. Low interest rates mean that the factor of time is less of an issue when planning resource allocation. That would be okay if low interest rates reflected society’s true time preference and propensity to save – if low interest rates were the result of saving and not money-printing. But in our world of fully elastic state money, interest rates are simply another policy tool. Easy monetary policy thus leads to asset prices and economic structures that are not in line with the true preferences of the consumer. Whenever the supply of new money slows, this becomes evident, the credit-structure begins to unravel and a recession sets in. However, the central bank then quickly lowers rates again, and sets off another artificial boom.

This has been going on, pretty much uninterrupted, for forty years. It is, as I said, the very essence of modern central banking and the paper money economy. All around us, the distortions that a system of fully flexible paper money must generate are increasingly palpable: an inflated and increasingly unstable financial sector, overstretched fractional-reserve banks, asset price bubbles, serial bailouts, excessive debt levels, persistent distortions in income and wealth distribution.

This is not capitalism. In fact, this system gives capitalism a bad name.

 

1 kilo gold bar

Real Money (photo by Swiss Banker - no joke!)

This morning, the Wall Street Journal headlines that the Fed signalled the end of bond buying with last night’s statement. As if this meant policy tightening! A pause – and it will only be a pause – in debt monetisation was already expected. Otherwise, the statement and press conference were timid. I think the reaction in the gold and fx market is telling: gold pushed through to another all-time nominal high, trading above 1,530 paper dollars an ounce as I write this. The dollar gets trashed again versus the other major toilet paper monies.

The market knows that the Fed is boxed in. Proper policy tightening is out of the question. The dislocations are way too big. The system is only propped up by ever more money from the Fed, ridiculously low interest rates and ever more public deficit spending.

The financial system is less stable today than at the time of the Lehman collapse. Lehman gave everybody a glimpse of the abyss, a notion of just how overstretched, distorted and shaky the global paper money system has become. And we have discovered another thing: a market-guided correction of the credit edifice cannot or will not be tolerated by the paper money bureaucracy. ‘Too big too fail’ is now the number one policy objective. Another Lehman has to be avoided at all cost. Market forces – which would necessarily point towards debt deflation and default and thus a proper, if painful, cleansing of the economic body- will be kept at bay with ever more extreme policy intervention. Nothing has been solved. The underlying problems are very much with us.

The big banks know this and play the system like a fiddle. As monetary policy cannot be tightened meaningfully, the state increasingly resorts to heavy-handed regulation to sort out the banks but this is countered quickly with blatant threats to cut back on lending if regulation gets too onerous. Of course, I am opposed to regulation and would rather have free capitalist banking with full risk of bankruptcy, which is only possible in a system of apolitical commodity money, entirely outside of state control. In our system, however, the state needs the banks and the banks – qua inherently insolvent and illiquid fractional-reserve banks – need the state. The public pays the price in the form of market distortions and a dwindling purchasing power of state paper money.

By the way, the unholy alliance between states and banks is evident in every advanced paper money economy. The bankrupt Portuguese government is now placing 90 percent of its bill issuance with its own banks. Like two drowning sailors hanging onto one another in order to postpone the inevitable, overstretched banks thus accumulate the debt of insolvent governments to keep the façade of solvency up and to stay in business themselves, a strategy by which the world’s most highly indebted country, Japan, has managed to project the mirage of sustainability for more than a decade.

But time is running out. Even if the Fed had announced an impending move to higher rates, the gold market would have, in my view, looked right through it. Nobody in Washington or on Wall Street has the cojones to undergo Volcker-style root-canal treatment. Proper monetary tightening – tightening that deserves the name and that cleanses the system of the accumulated distortions – is out of the question.

The economy will remain subdued and the financial sphere will remain painfully fragile. Easy money has a quickly diminishing return in respect of its impact on short-term growth. The trade-off between artificial growth and  persistent inflation gets progressively worse. Yet, Bernanke has no plan B. I am thus convinced that we have not seen the last of central bank asset buying. QE2 may end in June but QE3 will come. My hunch is that by Christmas the Fed’s balance sheet will be bigger, not smaller than today.

In the meantime, signs of rising inflation are everywhere. A gold price of $1,500, a silver price of $48 and an oil price of $113 are not harbinger of deflation. The demise of paper money continues.

Be that as it may, none of us can change it. So the question is how to survive it. In my view there is no alternative to gold (and maybe silver, although it is less clear-cut as a monetary asset). Whenever paper money systems disintegrate, gold – the eternal monetary asset -comes back. A 1980s-style correction in gold appears unlikely. Bernanke is no Volcker, and 2011 is not 1979. The system is vastly more overstretched today.

If gold were at $2,300 it would only be back at its 1980 high in inflation-adjusted terms. I think it will go much higher.

Furthermore, I think one should minimize economic exposure to the state (government bonds, dependency on any form of state transfer payment), banks (bank bonds, deposits) and paper money. Equities may continue to do well for a while on the back of easy money but they are ultimately a poor hedge in a paper money crisis. So is real estate (with the probable exception of arable land in certain locations). My forecast is this: gold will outperform inflation which will outperform stocks which will outperform the economy which will outperform fixed income which is the short of the century, in particular government bonds.

 

Dorothea Lange's depression picture of mother with children

The First Great Depression

Of course, Bernanke & Co believe that what they are doing is preventing another Great Depression. They are just keeping ‘aggregate demand’ up, buying the economy some time to heal. Soon the economy will be back to self-sustaining growth, and all sins of the past will be forgiven.

Yeah, and pigs will fly.

In fact, present policy is the disease, not the medicine. It is obstructing the economy’s process of healing and recovery, keeping it instead addicted to cheap credit forever – and to ever bigger doses of the drug.

The Great Depression was not the result of tight money in the 1930s but of easy money in the 1920s. Once money-induced distortions are substantial, a correction is inevitable. I strongly feel that dislocations are potentially even bigger today than in 1929, and that they are getting worse by present ‘stimulus’ policies.

The road to economic ruin is paved with state paper money. Prepare for some very nasty times!

 

 

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10 Responses to Nothing Solved! – An outlook

  1. Geschex says:

    If real estate is a poor hedge in very nasty times then arable land is not a possible exception. Non-arable land, however, may do the job. By definition it does not generate an income stream that will surely diminish in those nasty times. Consequently, during the catastrophe the relative price of non-arable land should outperform anything else with the notable exception of gold.

  2. Geschex says:

    Detlev believes that gold will go much higher than USD 2300 per ounce. Combine that with his other statement that government bonds be the short of the century. Remember the title of his first book, a masterpiece as future will tell, and it does not take a genius to arrive at a more precise medium-term forecast for gold: it will go to USD 4 million per ounce.

  3. Tim says:

    Hey Detlev,

    Thank you for all the analysis. I have a question regarding the predictions by some Austrian school deflationists (ie: Mish Shedlock). I’ll just make my statement and maybe you could be so kind as to let me know if I have some more learnin’ to do.

    I have come to my own conclusion that where the deflationist argument falls short is that they don’t really talk about interest on the debt. Maybe I am confused here but if the Federal Reserve were to quit propping up asset prices (especially bond prices) and if they allowed interest rates to be determined in the market I see no way that the US could realistically fund its deficit spending. Going by memory here I think the average rate of interest on the debt has been around the 3.3% range. Now if those rates went up at all that would be some serious money being paid out in just interest. I just fail to see where that money would come from if the Fed wasn’t monetizing. Who would buy such debt? For how long? That is the reason I personally have concluded that it is QE to infinity and beyond and the dollar is as good as dead.

    • Tim, I think you are absolutely right. The US state and the financial sector are dependent on a continuous flow of new funds at very low rates. If, or better when, the market becomes concerned about solvency and inflation, the flow of money will dry up and interest rates rise sharply. Then it’s game over. Debt that can’t be repaid won’t be repaid. As Doug Casey said, bankruptcy is a factual matter. But as long as the money keeps flowing and interest rates can be kept down, a facade of sustainability can be maintained for a while. For me the crucial point is this: in the recent crisis the US Fed (and other central banks) has already been opted into using its printing press to keep asset prices up, interest rates down and to fund state and banks more or less directly. This will continue and, when concerns over solvency and inflation grow and private capital becomes unavailable, even intensify. The printing press is the last line of defense for a bankrupt state and an over-leveraged financial sector. When the public realizes this, things can unravel quickly.

      I agree with the deflationists that we would see debt deflation and defaults if market forces were allowed to do their work. The present insanely inflated credit structure is unsustainable, and in a free market with ‘hard’ money, this would be reflected in lower bond prices and higher yields, which in turn would force some issuers to default. We would go through a painful period of adjustment but the economy would be, at the end of this process, closer to a state of balance. In my view, this would be the preferred solution. (We are way beyond the point of having any painless solutions at our disposal – the only question is how much pain and what type of pain we are willing to take – and when.) What the deflationists forget, however, is that the paper bureaucracy is doing everything to stay in business and to postpone the inevitable. “Not on my watch” is the slogan. The deflationists underestimate the power of the printing press — not to solve things but to postpone things — and create havoc in the process.

      For the deflationists to be right, policy would have to change completely and, after propping everything up for almost four years with all they got, central banks would have to allow a massive collapse of the credit edifice. I don’t see it.

  4. Zog says:

    It seems to me that we should look at different forms of Real Estate.

    Prime Central London Residential seems to currently being bought by some investors as a kind of “Hard Currency”; maybe those investors are right and maybe they are wrong – I don’t know. It could come down to which countries retain some political stability in the event of fallout.

    There are good quality commercial investments that can be bought close to build cost yielding 8%; whilst their short term value will inevitably plummet in the event of the crash we are envisaging, I would have thought that they would survive hyperinflation.

    Farmland is currently around £7,000 – £8,000 per acre; a figure that doesn’t reflect its percieved value as a hard currency nor the yield obtained which is abysmally low, but the fact that wealthy people just like to “own land”. I would have thought that there is a risk that such an asset could plunge in the event of a crash although,again, it is likely to survive hyperinflation.

    Just some thoughts.

    • Thanks, Zog. You are much more knowledgeable on real estate than I am. Personally, I remain somewhat skeptical on London real estate as a crisis hedge, although I agree that it should do better than most ‘paper’ assets — which will simply go to zero. A lot will depend on how the crisis unfolds, and on which areas are considered ‘safe’ and thus attract flight capital from other regions. My concerns are these: In a crisis, can your tenants still pay? Can you raise rents in line with accelerating inflation? In an ‘eat-the-rich’ social environment and with the state going bust, you are subject to additional taxation — and your asset is immobile — you are married to the local tax man. The crisis won’t be good for City bonuses which were crucial drivers of house price inflation in many London areas for years. As to arable land, I think it is down to location, location, location — and that probably means outside of Europe! It has been fashionable among the super-rich for some years to buy land in Latin America, New Zealand or even Africa. I don’t have the means and the know-how to do this. In large parts of Europe, agriculture is dependent on ongoing subsidization by the state — otherwise it wouldn’t be competitive on the global markets. Rising food inflation – and even food shortages – may lessen the dependence on state transfers but with the state going bankrupt – a key assumption in my worldview – this complicates matters. I take your point that, in England, it is too expensive. This leaves gold and silver. In physical form. I can’t see much beyond it.

  5. [...] Continue reading at Paper Money Collapse. [...]

  6. Zog says:

    You are of course correct, Detlev, in pointing out that property is an easy target for taxation. However, is there a risk that desperate governments will seek to tax other hard assets – including gold?

  7. joebhed says:

    I am just curious here with all the poobah over government debt-management policy and wondering where you guys were during the last decade when shadow bankers created most of the money (albeit funny-money and near-money substitutes for money) that drove us to the financial banking crisis?

    Was it OK for free-capital-marketeers of shadow bankers to run away with the store called the national economy, but just dreadful if the government tries to pick up the pieces by deficit spending?

    Just curious.

    • Can we really single out the ‘shadow’ bankers as the villains? After all, when the crisis hit, it was the real banks – all properly government-supervised and chaperoned by their central banks – that teetered on the brink of collapse (and in some cases did indeed collapse) and that almost brought the system down, not the ‘shadow’ banks. The paper-money franchise still rests with the state and its central bank, and it was the state and the central bank that signed off on the massive monetary expansion and build-up of leverage that created the long boom and now the the big bust – because they believed that money creation was harmless – or even beneficial – as long as it didn’t lead instantly to intolerable levels of CPI inflation. This fallacy is alive and well today — and still guides policy, now under the banner of ‘stimulus’.

      The notion that all of this was just the result of lack of oversight misses the point. In a system of ‘elastic’ money, a crisis such as the one we are in is sooner or later inevitable. The governments were, at a minimum, complicit in this — and benefited from easy money handsomely. They are now not picking up the pieces but trying to keep the system going– a system that, as long as it seems to work, bestows tremendous privileges on state and banks.

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